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ABSTRACT
Many current approaches to the design of intrusion detec-
tion systems apply feature selection in a static, non-adaptive
fashion. These methods often neglect the dynamic nature of
network data which requires to use adaptive feature selection
techniques. In this paper, we present a simple technique based
on incremental learning of support vector machines in order
to rank the features in real time within a streaming model for
network data. Some illustrative numerical experiments with
two popular benchmark datasets show that our approach al-
lows to adapt to changing network behaviour and novel attack
patterns.
Index Terms— network security, intrusion detection, on-
line learning, support vector machine, stochastic gradient de-
scent
1. INTRODUCTION
The design of efficient intrusion detection systems (IDS) has
received considerable attention recently. An IDS aims at iden-
tifying and mitigating malicious activities. Most of the cur-
rent IDSs can be divided into two main categories: signature-
based and anomaly-based IDS [1].
A signature-based IDS tries to detect intrusions by com-
paring the incoming network traffic to already known attacks,
which are stored in the database as signatures. This class of
IDS performs well in identifying known attacks but often fail
to detect novel (unseen) attacks [2].
The second category is referred to as anomaly-based IDS.
Those IDS models the normal traffic by learning patterns in
the training phase. They label deviations from these learned
patterns as anomaly or intrusion [3]. The implementation of
real-time anomaly-based IDS is challenging due to rapidly
evolving network traffic behavior and limited amount of
computational resources (computation time and memory) [4].
Another challenge is the risk of overfitting due to the high-
dimensional feature space and the model complexity of IDS.
[5, 6, 7, 8].
In this paper we will address some of the short comings
of existing anomaly-based IDS and present an efficient on-
line feature ranking method. Our approach is based on online
(or incremental) training of a support vector machine (SVM)
which allows to cope with limited computational resources.
The closest to our wok is [9, 10], which applies SVM for
feature selection in a static setting. In contrast, our feature
ranker finds approximate to the best feature subset in real-
time and in the case of streaming network traffic with chang-
ing behaviour. Some illustrative numerical experiments indi-
cate that real-time intrusion detection mechanisms using our
feature ranker can be trained faster and achieves less error rate
compared to offline (batch) feature selection methods.
This paper is organized as follows: The problem setup is
formalized in Section 2. In Section 3, we detail the proposed
online feature ranking method. The results of some illustra-
tive numerical experiments are discussed in Section 4.
2. PROBLEM SETUP
We consider a communication network within which infor-
mation is exchanged using atomic units of data which are re-
ferred to as “packets”. These packets consist of a header for
control information and the actual payload (user data). We
represent a packet by a feature vector x = (x1, · · · , xd) ∈ Rd
with d individual features xi listed in Table 1. The last feature
xd is a dummy feature being constant xd = 1.
A machine learning based IDS aims at classifying net-
work packets into the classes Y = {0, 1}. Each packet is
associated with a binary label y ∈ Y with y = 1 indicating a
malicious packet (an “attack”) and y = 0 for a regular (nor-
mal) data packet. We view an IDS as a classifier h : Rd → Y
which maps a given packet with feature vector x, to a pre-
dicted label yˆ = h(x) ∈ Y [11]. Naturally, the predicted label
yˆ should resemble the true class label y as accurate as possi-
ble. Thus, we construct the classifier h such that y ≈ h(x) for
any packet with feature vector x and true label y. In particular,
we measure the classification error incurred when classifying
a packet with feature x and true label y using the classifier h
by some loss function L((x, y), h). We will focus on a partic-
ular choice for the loss function as discussed in Section 3.1.
We learn the classifier h in a supervised fashion by relying
on a set of N labeled packets {xi, yi}Ni=1 (the training set).
In particular, we choose the classifier h by minimizing the
empirical risk
(1/N)
N∑
i=1
L((xi, yi), h) (1)
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incurred by h on the training data set {xi, yi}Ni=1. We will
restrict ourselves to linear classifiers h, i.e., which have a lin-
ear decision boundary. The corresponding hypothesis space,
constituted by all such linear classifiers, is
H = {h(w)(x) = I(wTx ≥ 0) for some w ∈ Rd}. (2)
Here, we used the indicator function I(“statement”) ∈ {0, 1}
which is equal to one of the argument is a true statement
and equal to zero otherwise. Using the parameterization (2),
learning the optimal classifier for an IDS amounts to finding
the optimal weight vector w ∈ Rd:
min
w∈Rd
(1/N)
N∑
i=1
L((xi, yi), h(w)). (3)
It turns out that most of the relevant information for classi-
fying network packets is often contained in a relatively small
number of features due to redundant or irrelevant features
[12]. Thus, it is beneficial to perform some form of feature se-
lection in order to avoid overfitting and improve the resulting
classification performance. Moreover, for an online or real-
time IDS, feature selection is instrumental in order to cope
with a limited budget of computational resources.
Most existing feature selection methods are based on sta-
tistical measures for dependency, such as Fisher score or (con-
ditional) mutual information, and therefore independent of
any particular classification method [13, 14]. In contrast, fea-
ture ranking methods use the entries wj fo the weight vector
w = (w1, . . . , wj) of a particular classifier, e.g., obtained via
solving (3), as a measure for the relevance of an individual
feature wj [15]. We will apply feature ranking based on the
weight vector obtained as the solution of (3) for the particular
loss function which is underlying the support vector machine
(SVM).
3. GENERAL ARCHITECTURE OF THE FEATURE
RANKER
. . . xk×N+1 xk×N+2 · · · · · · · · · x(k+1)×N . . .
Incoming packets with k = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
Real Time System
Machine learning
based IDS
Feature ranker
Historical
Data {xi, yi}N1
Check deviation
feature scores
First N packets
initial
training
{xi}(k+1)×Nk×N+1
ypredicted {y˜i}(k+1)×Nk×N+1
yactual
{yi}(k+1)×Nk×N+1
retraining with {yi}(k+1)×Nk×N+1
Fig. 1. General architecture of the proposed mechanism
Figure 1 shows the architecture of our system with an abil-
ity to rank features of the streaming data in real time based on
the weights of the support vector machines (SVM) classifier.
For the simplicity of our experiments, we used the same SVM
also for the IDS part, but it might be any other intrusion de-
tection mechanism using machine learning techniques.
Before training the feature ranker and the IDS, the first
N packets are collected as a historical data. These packets
are used for pretraining the feature ranker and the IDS. In our
feature ranker, features critical to detect attacks have negative
values, while features contributing for the normal traffic have
positive values. After waiting another N packets and predict-
ing the label of each packet as normal or attack, the mean
squared error
1
N
N∑
i=1
(yi − y˜i)2 (4)
is measured between the actual labels yi and the predicted
labels y˜i. If this error is quite high, then the feature ranker and
the learning model is retrained by feeding the actual labels to
the mechanism. Thus, feature weights are adapted to changes
in normal network behaviour or new attack strategies.
3.1. Support Vector Machines (SVM)
Our design of an IDS is based on (3) using the particular loss
loss function
L((x, y), h) = [1− y(wTx)]
+
+ (λ/2) ‖w‖2 , (5)
with the shorthand [z]+ = max{0, z}. The loss function (5)
consists of two components: The first component in (5) is
known as the hinge loss and underlying the SVM classifier.
The second component in (5) amounts to regularize the re-
sulting classifier in order to avoid overfitting to the training
data. and a regularization parameter λ > 0 which allows to
avoid overfitting. Inserting (5) into (3) yields the weight of
the SVM classifier
wˆ=argmin
w∈Rd
(1/N)
N∑
i=1
[
1−yi(wTxi)
]
+
+(λ/2) ‖w‖2 . (6)
Note that (6) is a non-smooth convex optimization problem
which precludes the application of basic gradient based op-
timization methods [16]. Instead, as detailed in Section 3.2,
we apply the stochastic sub-gradient method to solve (6) in an
online fashion.
Once we have learnt the optimal weight vector wˆ =
(wˆ1, . . . , wˆd)
T by solving (6), we can classify newly arriving
packet with feature x. Therefore, for any testing sample xi,
the SVM classifier h(·) can be written as
h(x) = I(wˆTx > 0). (7)
Thus, the classification result depends on the features xi via
the weights wˆi. A weight wˆi having large absolute value im-
plies that the feature xi has a strong influence no the classifi-
cation result [17]. It is therefore reasonable to keep only those
No Feature No Feature No Feature
1 ethernet type 23 IPv4 destination (divided into 4 features) 35 connection starting time
2 sender MAC address (divided into 6 features) 27 TCP source port 36 fragmentation
8 receiver MAC address ( divided into 6 features) 28 TCP destination port 37 overlapping
14 IPv4 header length 29 UDP source port 38 ACK packet
15 IP type of service 30 UDP destination port 39 retransmission
16 IPv4 length 31 UDP/TCP length 40 pushed packet
17 Time to live 32 ICMP type 41 SYN packet
18 IP protocol 33 ICMP code 42 FIN packet
19 IPv4 source (divided into 4 features) 34 duration of the connection 43 URG packet
Table 1. All features of a network packet used in online feature ranking mechanism.
features xi whose weights wi are largest and discard the re-
maining features in order to save computational resources and
avoid overfitting.
3.2. Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD)
A naive implementation of SVM does not scale well due to
excessive computational time and memory requirements [18].
In order to cope with the requirements of real-time IDS one
typically needs to use online implementations of SVM. A
simple modification of the linear SVM method can be done by
incorporating gradient methods and adapting optimum weight
vector as new data arrives.
Since SVM is trying to solve a convex cost function, we
can find a solution by using iterative optimization algorithms.
Stochastic gradient descent is one of the optimization algo-
rithm that minimizes the cost function by performing the gra-
dient descent on a single or few examples. in SGD, each k-th
iteration updates the weights of the learning algorithms in-
cluding SVM, percepton or linear regression, with respect to
the gradient of the loss function L
wk+1 = wk − α∇wLn(h(x), y), (8)
where α denotes constant learning rate and n is a set of in-
dices randomly sampled from the training set {xi, yi}Ni=1. In
our setup, we approximate the gradient by drawing M points
uniformly over the training data and perform mini batch it-
erations of SGD over SVM. Therefore the updates of weight
vector w will become
wk+1 = wk − α 1
M
M∑
j=0
∇wL(g(x)j , yj) (9)
Although the hinge loss is not differentiable, we can still
calculate the subgradient with respect to the weight vectorw.
The derivative of the hinge loss can be written as:
∂
[
1− yi(wTxi)
]
+
∂wk
=
{ −yixi yi(wTk xi + bi) < 1
0 otherwise.
(10)
Therefore, the gradient update for Equation 9 at k-th iteration
is calculated as:
wk+1 = wk − αλwk − 1
M
M∑
j=0
1[ (wTk xj + bj) < 1] yjxj ,
(11)
where 1[ (wTk xj + bj) < 1] is an indicator function which
results in one when its argument is true, and zero otherwise.
In large scale learning problems, SGD decreases the time
complexity, since it does not need all the data points to cal-
culate the loss. Although, it only samples few data point to
reach the optimum point, it provides a reasonable solution to
the optimization problem in the case of big data [19].
In our proposed feature ranker mechanism, the weight
vector of a SVM classifier is optimized in an online fashion
using SGD with mini batch size N . After predicting the la-
bels of packets in the next mini-batch, the predicted labels are
compared to the true classes of packets, which are decided by
experts. If the predicted labels highly deviate from the true
labels based on the MSE, then the weights are updated ac-
cording to this N packets. This also enables an online correc-
tion of the feature weights, since the weight vector is updated
based on the incoming N packets with a possible different
connections, applications or attacks.
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We verified the performance of the proposed IDS by means
of numerical experiements run on a 64bit Ubuntu 16.04 PC
with 8 GiB of RAM and CPU of 2.70GHz. Two differ-
ent datasets, the ISCX IDS 2012 dataset and CIC Android
Adware-General Malware, were used for our experiments
to test both batch and online algorithms. The ISCX-IDS
2012 dataset [20] was generated by the Canadian Institute for
Cybersecurity and mostly used for anomaly based intrusion
detection systems. This dataset includes seven days of traffic
and produces the complete capture of the all network traces
with HTTP, SMTP, SSH, IMAP, POP3, and FTP protocols. It
contains multi-stage intrusions such as SQL injection, HTTP
DoS, DDoS and SSH attacks. The CIC Android Adware-
General Malware dataset [21] is also produced by the same
research group. This dataset consists of malwares, includ-
ing viruses, worms, trojans and bots, on over 1900 Android
applications.
Both datasets are provided as pcap files including both
malicious network packets and normal packets. We selected
different malware types (InfoStl, Dishigy, Zbot, Gamarue) for
testing batch (offline) feature ranking. We used the ISCX-
IDS 2012 dataset for the online feature ranking, since it has
the complete capture of one week network traffic data without
any interruption to the overall connection. From each dataset,
we transferred raw packets to a file with 43 features using
“tshark” network analyzer. Table 1 lists all the features mea-
sured with tshark and used in the experiments.
The first set of experiments does not include online in-
cremental learning of SVM weights. It implements the lin-
ear SVM classifier with SGD update, as well as other widely
used feature selection algorithms, selects 20 features with the
highest weight out of 43, and uses them as an input to a
single-layer feedforward neural network with 10 hidden neu-
rons and sigmoid activation function. The experiments were
performed on various pcap files from the CIC Android dataset
having different sparsity, attacks and malwares in order to
prove that feature ranking with linear SVM weights in batch
(offline) learning provides good performance compared to the
other feature selection methods. Table 2 shows the experi-
mental results of these feature selection methods by measur-
ing the time spent on extracting the best features from the
training set and the accuracy of the classification. It can be
seen that linear SVM weights trained with the SGD method
is quite fast and generally gives a higher accuracy than the
other methods. Therefore, we can suggest that incremental
version of the linear SVM approach can be extended to the
case of streaming network traffic.
Malware type F-score Decision Trees Chi2time (sec.) accuracy time accuracy time accuracy
InfoStl 0.005 0.891 0.022 0.993 0.005 0.992
Dishigy 0.002 0.651 0.018 0.987 0.002 1.0
Zbot 0.002 0.970 0.017 0.989 0.002 0.987
Gamarue 0.002 0.933 0.016 0.947 0.002 0.947
Mutual info. RFE SVM weights
time (sec.) accuracy time accuracy time accuracy
InfoStl 2.503 0.993 1.208 0.995 0.005 0.995
Dishigy 0.364 1.0 0.121 1.0 0.001 1.0
Zbot 0.633 0.988 0.241 0.987 0.001 0.989
Gamarue 0.240 0.946 0.088 0.969 0.001 0.964
Bold:best result achieved
Table 2. Feature selection comparison with different mal-
wares
The second experiment was implemented with both of-
fline and online SVM with a linear kernel in the case of
streaming network data. Both feature weighting and clas-
sification is done by linear SVM in either online or offline
fashion. Experiments were performed with the ISCX-IDS
2012 dataset. Figure 2 shows the mean squared error between
the true and predicted labels of the streaming data while the
network behaviour changes and new type of attacks are fed
to the input. Unlike the offline SVM, online SVM changes
its weight vector in a sliding window with N packets.The
training was implemented in the first 100 ∗ N packets which
spans one day of network activities including injection at-
tacks. The second day comes with a more complex and
harder to detect injection attack and the third day also starts
with a DoS attack. As can be seen in the figure, our online
feature ranker model is able to adapt itself to a change in the
network statistics. However, batch learning with SVM per-
forms poorly when the arriving packets shows a completely
different behaviour. In conclusion, on-line models quickly
adapt to changing behaviour in the network data and achieves
a notable improvement on the performance of prediction over
batch learning.
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Fig. 2. MSE of the streaming test data with a load change
The last experiment was also implemented with the ISCX-
IDS 2012 dataset by choosing 3 days of network data with
different attacks to prove that the importance of features are
different for each attack. Figure 3 shows the resulting abso-
lute weights of randomly selected 5 features. Figure 3 indi-
cates that feature weights change even from positive to nega-
tive in each day having different connections and different at-
tack types. These results prove that our feature ranker mecha-
nism works as we desired and adjusts the feature weights with
streaming network data.
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Fig. 3. Feature Weights for Different Network Behaviors
5. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a simple method based on incre-
mental learning of linear SVM models to rank or weight fea-
tures in real time. Experimental results indicated that our
method can adjust the importance of any feature based on
not only the changing network behaviour but also for novel
attacks. In future research, the online feature ranking with a
variable chunk size will be incorporated to better fine-tuning
of our proposed method. In addition, the weights of the fea-
tures will be used as input layer weights of neural networks
based IDSs, which can be used as real-time and self-trained
intrusion detection mechanism.
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